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 1. Introduction 
  At the beginning of the 19th century, the monetary laws of many countries 
allowed coins made from various precious metals to be minted and circulated.  Such 
commodity-money systems are known as bimetallist standards.  Gold was used for 
high-value transactions, while silver, bronze or copper coins were used for the rest.  
Great Britain was the exception, establishing a de facto monometallic system in 1821.  
The German states, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Scandinavia, Russia and the Far 
East operated under the aegis of silver standards.  Countries with bimetallist stan-
dards, like France, had links with the gold and silver blocs
2. 
  The industrial revolution led to the emergence of Great Britain as the leading 
trading and industrial power in the 19
th century, and as the main source of external 
finance.  This fact encouraged other countries to try and tighten trading relations with 
Great Britain and to go to London for capital loans. 
  Portugal, which enjoyed strong commercial ties with the British economy, was 
the first European country to join Great Britain in the Gold Standard, in 1854, adher-
ing to it for a considerable period, only abandoning it in 1891
3.  Portugal’s adherence 
to the monometallic gold system lasted 37 years, longer than what is regarded as the 
classical Gold Standard period, from 1880 to 1914.  Besides a desire to share the same 
monetary system as its chief trading partner, the low price of gold and the circulation 
of British gold coinage at home may also have contributed to the adoption of the Gold 
Standard in Portugal
4. 
  It provided a nominal stable anchor during the period it was in operation, be-
tween July 1854 and June 1891, and it was also a mechanism of credible commitment, 
even though the Portuguese monetary authorities often violated the “rules of the 
game”.  The functioning of the Gold Standard in Portugal was characterized by an 
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overall picture of nominal stability, in terms of both exchange rates and prices, with 
product behaviour showing quite a favourable evolution in the light of the stagnation 
observed up to 1854
5. 
  Then followed a period of monetary instability and flexible exchange rates, as 
a result of the suspension of the free convertibility of currency into gold at a fixed 
price, a decision which was taken by all countries after 1913, when the international 
monetary system known as the Classical Gold Standard began to collapse, owing to 
the massive shocks of the First World War. 
  But if Portugal was one of the first countries, along with Great Britain, to ad-
here to the international Gold Standard, it was the last European country to try restor-
ing the full convertibility of its currency, in 1931, at a time when financial crisis was 
looming in Europe
6. 
  This paper aims to elucidate the historical choice of the Gold Standard by the 
Portuguese authorities, and to analyse its macroeconomic behaviour.  Certain per-
formance indicators of this system are compared with the systems that followed it.  
With respect to comparison criteria, will draw attention of using different indicators 
for different systems, something that is largely ignored.  We came to the conclusion in 
an earlier study
7 that, from the point of view of money and nominal income, the pe-
riod 1854-1913 was very similar to the strict period of the Gold Standard.  This is 
why we have focused a certain amount of attention on comparing these two periods.  
The macroeconomic study considers the characteristics of the series used, and is 
based on a VAR model.  We have used this model to analyse the mutual influence of 
the variables studied, emphasizing shock analysis. 
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  The data used have been taken from Ana Nunes; Mata and Valério (1989) and 
Dina Batista; Carlos Martins; Maximiano Pinheiro and Pinheiro Reis (1997).  The 
econometric software employed to process the series was RATS, version 5.1. 
  The paper is composed of seven points.  Point 2 gives a retrospective history 
of how Portugal came to adhere to the Gold Standard and analyses some of the factors 
that contributed to that decision.  The unique participation of the Portuguese economy 
in this monetary system is highlighted, bearing in mind the reasons for the emergence 
of the gold standard as an international monetary system.  Point 3 describes the func-
tioning of the Gold Standard in Portugal and examines the reasons for its collapse in 
June 1891.  It further looks at the circumstances under which it was restored and again 
discarded, in the context of the international financial crisis of the 1930s.  Point 4 
raises the issue of the presumable evolution of prices and inflation under the Gold 
Standard, based on a very simple model by which conclusions are drawn with respect 
to those variables.  Point 5 compares different monetary systems in Portugal and looks 
at the stationary behaviour of macroeconomic series.  Point 6 concentrates on a de-
scription of the VAR model.  It begins with the selection of the order for the two peri-
ods mentioned above, 1854-1891 and 1854-1913, to show the importance of each 
variable in the explanation of the others.  Next, the responses of the different variables 
to shocks in each of them are studied.  Finally, we concentrate on the Gold Standard 
period and after resolving some identification problems of the model, short-term 
shocks that are identified with demand, supply and money supply are studied.  The 
last point, Point 7, concludes this work, while indicating some openings for future 
research. 
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2. The Process of Portugal’s Adherence to the Gold Standard 
The anarchy of the monetary circulation prevailing in the first half of the 19
th 
century
8 led to a realisation that the only way to solve the problem appeared to be a 
change to a monometallic system
9.  This would also be the only way to prevent the 
flight of silver abroad, either as a result of speculative hoarding, or through its export 
to countries where both official and market value were in closer alignment. 
On May 1
st 1854, after two years of gold depreciating against silver, the ‘re-
generative’ government of Fontes Pereira de Melo laid a proposal for the reform of 
the Portuguese monetary system before the Chamber of Deputies. The proposal envis-
aged the resolution of Portugal’s monetary problems through the establishment of a 
monometallic gold system, exactly like the one operating in Great Britain since 1821. 
The debate went on until the second half of May, with the arguments raised 
being essentially technical
10.  Those opposed queried which would be the most oppor-
tune time to join the Gold Standard, considering that most countries, notably France, 
were still operating a bimetallic system.  They also expressed concern that a state mo-
nopoly of silver coinage, arising from the monetary reform, could be over-used, since 
the purpose of gaining revenue from seigniorage and minting silver coins could lead 
to an increase in prices.  The government’s answer was to immediately exclude this 
possibility, backing its argument by limiting the acceptance of silver in commercial 
transactions. 
The increase in gold production was to be absorbed by the growth in economic 
activity at international level, and so there should be no cause for worry.  Further-
more, defenders of the proposed reform of Portugal’s monetary system, particularly 
its rapporteur, Casal Ribeiro, the minister Fontes Pereira de Melo, and Lobo de Ávila, 
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stressed the fact that a bimetallic system could lead to marked instability, associated 
with the operation of Gresham’s Law, which could only be overcome by adopting a 
single precious metal as the basis of the monetary system.  But the choice could not 
fall on silver.  First, because of the upheavals caused by its sudden depletion owing to 
differences in its relative price; and second, because monetary circulation in Portugal 
was then in the mainly form of gold coinage, and so if this precious metal were not 
chosen as the basis of the system, a new monetary stock would have to be acquired. 
After a succession of technical changes, the proposed reform of the Portuguese 
monetary system was finally approved on May 15
th and became law on July 29
th 
1854, making Portugal the first country in Europe, to join Great Britain in adhering to 
the Gold Standard.  The real was defined solely in terms of gold, as 1.626 mg of fine 
gold, which represented a drop in its value of 1.03%, relative to the parity fixed in 
1847.  All the classical rules of the Gold Standard monetary system were enshrined in 
the drawing up of the Law’s various articles, to reproduce the essential characteristics 
of the British Gold Standard
11. 
Portugal’s 1854 decision to adhere to the Gold Standard is hardly surprising, 
given the peripheral nature of the country.  It displays a number of singular features 
that underline the importance of the choice of the moment for the changeover to the 
new monetary system, which can only be understood in terms of the monetary, politi-
cal and economic circumstances described above.  Portugal was by no means a rich 
industrialized country that could opt for gold for the benefits that it afforded in carry-
ing out high-value transactions.  On the contrary, it was a poor country, lacking the 
capacity to mint its own currency on any grand scale, and this was why its economy 
was largely non-monetarized
12.  Furthermore, the need to make small, frequent pay-
ments at the level of its chief productive sector, agriculture, meant that the “entrepre-
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neurial farming class” preferred silver to gold, since it enabled it to reduce transaction 
costs
13. 
By adopting the Gold Standard early on, the country was clearly distancing it-
self from the prevailing tendency to demonetise gold that existed in Spain, Naples and 
Holland, and other states, while simultaneously excluding the option of following 
France’s bimetallic system.  The choice of the moment to institute the gold monome-
tallic system in Portugal is also interesting in that the decision was taken almost 
twenty years before the leading European countries shifted to the Gold Standard.  It 
was left to Germany, the second largest economic power in Europe to start this 
change at international level, when, in 1872, it abandoned silver in favour of gold, 
also as the result of monetary reform
14. 
  Since they were commercially dependent on Germany and were in close geo-
graphical proximity to it, Sweden, Denmark and Norway quickly followed suit, join-
ing the Gold Standard in 1873 as part of the Scandinavian Monetary Union
15.  In a 
proper chain reaction, Holland and the countries in the Latin Monetary Union were 
also drawn towards gold monometallism.  France, which in 1873 restricted the free 
minting of silver, definitively adhered to the Gold Standard in 1878, along with Bel-
gium and Switzerland
16.  At the end of the 19
th century Spain was the only country in 
Europe to retain non-convertible paper money, although it had given up bimetallism 
in 1883. 
The Gold Standard originally developed more or less spontaneously, for his-
torical reasons or due to political-ideological, commercial or financial influences, at a 
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national level on the basis of countries individual choices.  Nevertheless, as the legal 
tender of silver lost its importance and became increasingly discarded as a monetary 
standard, the Gold Standard eventually emerged in the 1890s as the world standard, 
and is referred to in the literature as the classical Gold Standard.  It ended up by oper-
ating as an authentic international monetary system between 1880 and 1914, at which 
time it entered into decline as a result of the shocks of the First World War
17. 
  But none of the factors responsible for the emergence of the Gold Standard as 
the international monetary system quite fits the events that led to Portugal’s decision 
in 1854
18.  If we list the chief elements that played some part in the generalized shift 
to the Gold Standard during the 1870s and ‘80s, we find it hard to see that any of 
them were decisive in the process of Portugal’s adherence to the new monetary sys-
tem. 
In the first place, Portugal’s adherence to the Gold Standard was not favoured 
by technical issues
19.  When Portugal joined the gold monometallic system, the au-
thorities were striving to supply a currency of acceptable quality and in sufficient 
quantity to facilitate low-value transactions, largely because of the Casa da Moeda’s 
(national mint) technical limitations, since its economy was far less monetised in rela-
tion to those of most European countries.  In these circumstances, questions of a tech-
nical nature were not determinants in the process of Portugal’s adherence to the Gold 
Standard. 
Second, there is nothing to lead one to conclude that Portugal’s adoption of the 
Gold Standard was related to a “gold ideology” prevailing in the country or, more 
specifically, that it was associated with the role played by an “urban-industrial class”, 
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or any other social group
20.  It was only later, after the Paris Conference of 1867 that 
this ideology was to influence other countries to adhere to the Gold Standard
21. 
  Third, it is hard to see that, in the Portuguese case, the adoption of gold as a 
monetary standard could have been the result of being “dragged along” in the wake of 
certain other countries’ adhesion, with others following suit.  When Portugal decided 
to adhere to gold monometallism, only Great Britain was using this system.  The fact 
that this country was a dominant economic power was not enough to trigger the chain 
reaction observed twenty years later, when most countries ended up by joining the 
Gold Standard, drawn into it by German policy or the French decision
22. 
Finally, Portugal’s joining was not determined by financial reasons, which are 
sometimes held to be one of the main factors determining the change to gold mono-
metallism at international level.  The adoption of the Gold Standard could also be 
related to reducing the costs of loans on the international capital markets, where it 
would operate as a sign of financial credibility
23.  The change to a gold monometallic 
system would make it possible to obtain funds more cheaply on the capital markets, 
especially on the London market, but it would also help to overcome any problems in 
attracting external financing.  However, there is no good reason to suppose that one of 
the factors responsible for Portugal’s adhesion to the Gold Standard would have been 
easier access to the international capital markets; but this does not mean that it was 
not useful at a later stage
24. 
  The problem observed in the 1850s in attracting outside finance, particularly 
for building railway lines, was mostly related to the lack of credit guarantees, and not 
really to the kind of monetary system; Spain, for instance, with its bimetallist, non-
convertible system, managed to attract more capital. 
                                                           
20 See Jaime Reis (1995). 
21 See Gallarotti (1995) and Christopher Meissner (2002). 
22 See Jaime Reis (1995), Bordo and Eichengreen (2001) and Meissner (2002). 
23 As a “good housekeeping seal of approval”. See Bordo and Hugh Rockoff (1996).   10
  As we cannot attribute a determining role to any of the factors responsible for 
the emergence of the international Gold Standard in Portugal’s decision, taken in 
1854, we have to conclude that, besides the monetary, political and economic circum-
stances analysed earlier, the country’s adherence to the model followed by Great Brit-
ain, was encouraged by a set of specific circumstances, certain facets of which once 
again have considerable singularity. 
First of all, the change to the new system was facilitated by (a) its low imple-
mentation cost, relative to the charges that would have resulted from the adoption of a 
silver monometallism, (b) the fall of the international price of gold, (c) the widespread 
circulation of gold coinage within Portugal, as mentioned above, and (d) the fact that 
there was a significant inflow of British gold coins, coming from Brazil, due to the 
repatriation of capital
25. 
Jaime Reis (1995), sees the 1854 decision as a consequence “of accidents of 
History”, and a purely natural response to the monetary chaos obtaining in the Portu-
guese economy at the end of the 1840s.  But when Portugal decided to implement the 
Gold Standard, it was already virtually governed by it, and so it was not a matter of 
choosing an ideal monetary system model, but, rather, a system that would be worka-
ble and with lower transaction costs.  Portugal chose to follow the British model be-
cause it worked well, it could guarantee gold coinage and silver small change for car-
rying out large and small transactions.  The relatively extensive outflow of silver in 
the Portuguese economy may also explain the early adherence of Portugal to the Gold 
Standard and, at the same time, the somewhat delayed adoption of it by other coun-
tries. 
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3. Some Features of the Functioning of the Gold Standard in Portugal 
The functioning of the Gold Standard monetary system in Portugal basically 
reproduces the characteristics of the British model of gold monometallism, even 
though, in practice, there was a certain withdrawal from what had been envisaged.  
The divergences were not enough, however, to prevent the Gold Standard from work-
ing well in Portugal for nearly 37 years, a longer spell than the so-called classical 
Gold Standard period (1880 to 1914). 
The articles in the law of July 29
th 1854 contained all the classical rules for the 
operating of the Gold Standard monetary system.  The Portuguese accounting unit 
became established solely in terms of gold, at a parity of 1.626 mg of fine gold per 
real, the equivalent of 1.7735 mg of gold alloy of 916 2/3 per real.  This definition 
illustrates the close proximity to the British model in that the alloy used by Great 
Britain was chosen, and not that used in France’s bimetallist system, which was 900 
per thousand.  It was also established that bank notes would be freely convertible into 
gold. 
Private individuals could take any gold they had to the Casa da Moeda (na-
tional mint) to be freely coined, after which operation it could be exchanged, at no 
extra cost, for legal currency, unless it weighed over one kilogram, in which case it 
would be liable to a tax of one thousand réis.  Copper and silver coins became a 
means for subsidiary payment, and were minted exclusively by the State, with a face 
value greater than the market one, and with a legal tender restricted to five thousand 
réis per transaction
26. 
During the period in which the Gold Standard was in force in Portugal, the 
money supply was made up of imported British sovereigns and half-sovereigns which, 
contrary to other foreign gold coins, remained legal tender, but they were accepted at 
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par and not overvalued, as had happened up to the introduction of the new monetary 
system.  They increased considerably in number as a result of the positive balance of 
payments situation, due largely to loans obtained on the international market and the 
capital flows from emigrants’ remittances
27. 
The position of Portugal in terms of external payments meant that its economy 
became highly dependent on the evolution of the political, social and economic situa-
tion in Brazil, and on its main financial partner, Great Britain. 
Monetary dependence on the outside world was nothing new, but in the new 
monetary context obtaining in Portugal it began to take on greater importance
28.  Por-
tugal was not merely before a Gold Standard, it was confronted by a sterling Gold 
Standard, given the key role played by the sovereign and half-sovereign in monetary 
circulation
29.  Among the various negative aspects that were to arise from that situa-
tion, “wounded national pride” is conspicuous, due to the possibility of the Portuguese 
economy becoming even more dependent on that of Britain.  In addition to this, the 
fact that the English Mint was guided by more rigorous standards of weight and alloy 
in currency coinage, and that it immediately got rid of all non-standardized coins, 
increased fears of a possible tendency for the more worn and lighter coins to be intro-
duced into Portugal, causing its currency reserves often to be composed of “weak” 
coinage
30. 
  One of the most important features of the Gold Standard in Portugal, besides 
its tight relationship of monetary dependence vis-à-vis British gold coinage, was the 
fact that it embraced a monetary rule or mechanism of credible commitment, on the 
basis of which attempts were made over the years to restrict, or even sanction, the 
actions of the monetary authorities.  The rule of maintaining a fixed price for gold in 
                                                           
27 See Mata and Valério (1995). 
28 In 1854 British gold coins accounted for 56% of the money supply, and in 1890, one year before the 
gold standard was abandoned, it comprised 74%. See Rita Sousa (1991) and Mata and Valério (1993). 
29 See Jaime Reis (1995).   13
terms of national currency may be seen as a mechanism of credible commitment 
whose aim would be to prevent the authorities from embarking on inconsistent mone-
tary and budgetary policies
31. 
The rule of the Gold Standard could also be regarded as a type of contingency 
rule, or a rule with escape clauses, which could be evoked in exceptional circum-
stances due to outside causes, beyond the responsibility of the monetary authorities.  
They were pledged to keep the prices of their currency fixed in terms of gold, except 
in the wake of clearly understood upsets, such as a major war, a severe financial crisis 
or a shock in terms of trade
32. 
At international level, the underlying principle consists of maintaining the free 
convertibility into gold at the established par value.  In this context, the commitment 
by the various countries to maintain a fixed price for gold should have ensured fixed 
exchange rates.  As a result, the use of monetary and budgetary policy to achieve do-
mestic goals was subordinated to the maintenance of gold convertibility.  Monetary 
policy could be used to pursue domestic aims only within the gold points which repre-
sented a system of exchange rates similar to that of target zones
33. 
In the period 1880 to 1914, exchange rate fluctuations were very small, espe-
cially in the central countries, thus revealing the high level of stability of exchange 
rates in the period when the Classical Gold Standard was in operation
34.  Even though 
the exchange rates strayed quite often from the par value, infringements of the gold 
points and devaluations were nonetheless rare.  With the credible adoption of gold 
convertibility, countries undertook to keep exchange rates stable, not to follow a pol-
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icy of gradual inflation and to return to the par value for the exchange rate after any 
shock that temporarily forced to suspend convertibility
35. 
  In the case of Portugal, the Gold Standard functioned well until 1891, apart 
from during the financial crisis of 1876, a period when the government ordered a 
moratorium of three months, which included a two-month suspension of gold con-
vertibility for bank notes.  The government further sought to avert the banking crisis 
of 1891, supporting the Bank of Portugal by supplying a million sovereigns, but to no 
avail.  Apart from this occasion, everything seems to indicate that the principle of free 
gold convertibility for the Portuguese currency at a fixed price functioned without 
problems until 1891, when it was abandoned, even though the Classical Gold Stan-
dard was to last until the outbreak of the First World War
36. 
  For 37 years Portugal experienced a situation of fixed exchange rates, with the 
currency pegged to gold.  The sovereign/real parity remained unchanged from 1854 
to 1891
37.  This was the basis on which the Gold Standard monetary system in Portu-
gal provided a stable nominal anchor and a credible commitment mechanism, even 
though the monetary authorities violated the gold points. 
  Exchange stability within the gold points was respected, by and large, while 
Portugal remained within the international Gold Standard, although there was some 
foreign exchange volatility in the sovereign/real relation.  This was sometimes ex-
pressed in the breach of the import and export point of gold
38.  The Gold Standard in 
Portugal thus represented an appreciable level of exchange rate stability, and one that 
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grew with the passage of time, as can be seen from the lower number of violations of 
the gold points. 
  However, the context of exchange rate stability afforded by the Gold Standard 
from 1860 until the end of convertibility, in June 1891, notwithstanding, the Bank of 
Portugal pursued an active monetary policy, with frequent violations of the “rules of 
the game” by only using its discount rate sporadically to maintain foreign exchange 
reserves
39.  This situation, aggravated by a steady exit of gold, was expressed in prob-
lems of maintaining the proportion between the fiat money and the metal reserves that 
were regularly reduced at a worrying rate. 
  In these circumstances it was only possible to maintain the commitment 
mechanism to the international Gold Standard rule in a credible manner by continu-
ally resorting to borrowing from London, which enabled gold and gold coins to be 
imported in sufficient amounts to re-establish the proportion between the bank notes 
in circulation and the reserves guaranteeing them
40.  The use of instruments was to 
some extent inverted.  Only in the last resource was the discount rate increased, the 
preferred option being foreign borrowing.  In the case of the Bank of Portugal, up-
holding the credibility of the commitment to the Portuguese currency’s gold converti-
bility crucially relied on cooperation between the central banks, although the mone-
tary authorities often broke the “rules of the game”. 
  But if the strict monetary discipline of the Gold Standard provided an overall 
picture of nominal stability, the period when Portugal adopted it was characterized by 
unrelenting deficits in the trade balance and persistent negative balances in the public 
accounts.  This was not unrelated to the adoption of a number of “modernization” 
policies, associated with the creation of economic and social infrastructures. 
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Despite all this, until 1890, Portugal managed to obtain long-term loans, both 
at home and abroad, to cope with the trade deficit
41.  In addition, the country suc-
ceeded in compensating for its negative trade balance by means of revenue from the 
remittances of emigrants in Brazil and earnings from Portuguese investments abroad, 
which were significant enough to achieve a series of balance of payments surpluses.  
In spite of Portugal being a debtor country in terms of current transactions, it re-
mained a regular importer of gold, unlike other peripheral countries, and this situation 
allowed it to sustain the credibility of its commitment to convertibility.  Public ac-
counts deficits could be financed by borrowing from the markets, with an inflow of 
gold sufficient to maintain convertibility also being allowed
42. 
  In the long-run, meanwhile, the accumulation of these balances in the public 
accounts, along with those in the trade balance, made the abandoning of the Gold 
Standard inevitable when the 1890-1892 crisis struck.  The early 90s were marked by 
a number of problems that led to a widespread lack of confidence, provoking the col-
lapse of the Portuguese Gold Standard. 
  Brazil was undergoing a period of serious social and political instability fol-
lowing the abolition of slavery in 1888, and the end of the monarchy, a year later.  
The Brazilian crisis had the effect of severely reducing emigrants’ remittances which 
made it hard to prop up the Gold Standard system
43.  One of the factors that fed the 
stock of Portuguese gold thus disappeared
44.  In 1890 and 1891 alone remittances fell 
20% and 40%, respectively.  Portugal also got itself embroiled in a diplomatic conflict 
with Great Britain, which led to the British ultimatum of January 1890, while, at the 
same time, the Baring Brothers crisis, the Portuguese government’s chief London 
Bank, further worsened an already delicate economic situation.  The beginning of 
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1891 saw the recurrence of political and social instability, in the wake of a failed at-
tempt to establish a Republic.  Between January and April of that year, currency re-
serves fell by a half. 
  Added to all this, an unsuccessful attempt to issue an external loan to obtain 
international liquidity resulted in a run on the banks to exchange notes for gold coins; 
when the monetary authorities were unable to meet this the abandoning of the Gold 
Standard was inevitable.  There followed a period of monetary instability and flexible 
exchange rates, due to the suspension of the free gold convertibility of the currency on 
May 9
th 1891.  Exactly the same decision was taken by all the other countries after 
1913, when the massive shocks of the Great War caused the international Gold Stan-
dard to enter into a state of collapse. 
  Gold coins were either hoarded or exported, and the money supply largely 
took the form of bank notes.  During and immediately after the War, Portugal suffered 
a period of high inflation and economic difficulties.  The money supply was increased 
several times, following borrowing by the State from the Bank of Portugal to finance 
(monetise) the gaping budget deficits.  The devaluation of Portugal’s currency, the 
escudo, introduced to replace the real in 1911, was relatively moderate during the 
War, but it accelerated sharply between 1919 and 1924.  The Bank of Portugal’s gold 
reserves were far too low to cope with any run on the bank, should the Portuguese 
currency see its gold convertibility re-established
45. 
It seems that the possibility of restoring the Gold Standard was never formally 
given up by the Portuguese monetary authorities
46.  For this, the importance of rela-
tions between Portugal and Great Britain, which went back to gold in April 1925, and 
the international prestige of the Gold Standard for fostering price and exchange rate 
stability had considerable weight.  But the project was never seriously considered, and 
                                                           
45 See Mata and Valério (1995) and Santos (1995). 
46 Idem.   18
so a definitive stabilization of the exchange rate was only achieved in July 1931.  This 
situation led to the adoption of a gold-exchange standard, following the recommenda-
tions of the 1922 Geneva Conference, under which full convertibility of the Portu-
guese currency could be restored relative to the British currency, convertible into 
gold, albeit at a devalued parity. 
The gold escudo was defined as weighing 0.0739 gm of gold with a purity of 
900/1000, the equivalent of a parity of 110 escudos to the pound sterling.  For this, the 
Bank of Portugal was obliged to keep reserves of gold, foreign currency or other for-
eign assets convertible into gold, corresponding to at least 30% of its monetary liabili-
ties.  As the inflationary effects of the monetisation of the public deficits were still 
being felt, strict limits were imposed on the issue of notes intended to cover the gov-
ernment’s financing requirements
47. 
  But if Portugal was the first country to join Great Britain in adhering to the 
international Gold Standard system, it was the last to restore the full convertibility of 
its currency, which is once again surprising, since it was returning to gold at a time 
when the beginning of an exceptionally turbulent period for the functioning of the 
international monetary system was imminent
48.  This return raises some questions.  
Why did the authorities re-establish the Gold Standard when the instability of the in-
ternational financial situation was already clear?  Why did the decision to go back to a 
monetary system based on gold take so long, when the escudo had been practically 
stable since 1924? 
  The full re-establishment of the convertibility of the Portuguese currency in 
1931 was part of a global policy, the first step of which was to stabilize the budget.  
With a political system of dictatorship and the control of the public finances firmly 
established, the conclusion of Salazar’s reforms with a return to the Gold Standard 
                                                           
47 See M. Kock (1982) and Santos (1995). 
48 See Macedo; Eichengreen and Jaime Reis (1995), Santos (1995) and Jaime Reis (1995).   19
was also designed to attract foreign capital, so that Portugal could face the problems 
of international payments
49.  Portugal was going back to gold when other countries 
were leaving it. 
The suspension of the pound sterling’s gold convertibility on September 21
st 
1931, as a consequence of the effects of the failure of the Kreditanstalt and the Ger-
man banking crisis, brought about the collapse of the monetary system between the 
wars
50.  The countries that maintained important trading relations with Great Britain 
were forced to abandon the Gold Standard.  This occurred in Portugal, which sus-
pended the gold convertibility of its currency following the British decision, just 82 
days after its introduction. 
  The Portuguese monetary authorities then decided to peg the escudo to ster-
ling, and a fixed exchange rate regime operated in Portugal from 1931 to 1938
51. The 
importance of the trading relations with Great Britain and the fact that most of Portu-
gal’s external assets were denominated in pounds, explain the decision to anchor the 
escudo to the pound sterling.  Pegging the escudo to the British currency was a way of 
ensuring the stability of the Portuguese monetary unit that would function as a close 
substitute for the Gold Standard. 
  After the Second World War, in 1949, the escudo was pegged to the dollar.  
Even though it was only in 1962 that Portugal joined the IMF, it can still be said that 
it saw the same period of fixed exchange as the Bretton Woods system until the early 
1970s. 
 
                                                           
49 See Mata (1987), Santos (1995) and Mata and Valério (1995). 
50 See Leland Crabbe (1989), Bourget; Figliuzzi and Zenou (2002) and Robert Hetzel (2002). 
51 See Banco de Portugal (1932), Bordo and Santos (1995) and Santos (1995).   20
4. Inflation and Prices under the Gold Standard 
  In order to find out about the characteristic of price and inflation stationarity 
under different monetary systems, let us suppose a very simple macroeconomic 
model. 
Let us take a product equation, (1.1), where current values are determined in 
accordance with a Phillips curve.  A simple supply of this type is also often called a 
Lucas supply curve, where pt-1 represents the anticipation of prices.  Price behaviour 
is given by equation (1.2).  In this equation, the constant is a useful variable enabling 
us to take into account the technological evolution registered in the economy and, 
further, the type of markets that characterize it.  The presence of lagged prices ex-
presses a partial adjustment relation.  The last part of the equation incorporates the 
effects of global excess demand.  Finally, equation (1.3) shows the behaviour of the 
amount of money in circulation.  Besides the constant, it contains one component of 
partial adaptation and another that expresses what may be termed the “endogeneity” 
of its behaviour.  The variables are expressed in logs.  
     ) (     1 − − ⋅ + = t t t p p y y γ       (1.1) 
              01 1    () tC t t p py y ββ β − =+ ⋅+ ⋅ −    (1.2) 
             1 1 1 0     − − ⋅ + ⋅ + = t t C t p m m α α α      (1.3) 
  Substituting (1.2) in (1.1) we get, after simplifying, 
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  Reorganizing (1.3) in terms of prices and substituting in (1.4), we get the fol-
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While equation (1.4) interprets the behaviour of prices, only considering the 
real part of the economy, equation (1.5) shows price behaviour in terms of the real 
and monetary part of the economy. 
We move on to compare the two states of the economy that we are interested 
in, an economy with a convertible currency and an economy with a non-convertible 
currency, and analyse the consequences of the descriptions of these two states. 
In the convertible currency situation, it is reasonable to assume that prices re-
act to demand and will be flexible in the manner β0 = 0
52.  At the same time, we feel it 
is also reasonable to consider that productivity evolution in a competitive market will 
lead to β0 < 0.  Deflationary pressure is obvious, unless we see equation (1.6), which 
we get from (1.4), 
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The two components that constitute the prices behaviour have negative values.  
If prices show high flexibility, then β1 → 1, and so δ → 0.  But regardless of the situa-
tion, prices are far from displaying a unit root in their behaviour.  We also see that 
(1.6) expresses the absence of a “buffer effect” of prices that is normally given by the 
inertia (0< β0 <1) of its behaviour. 
The situation in an economy with non-convertible currency is different.  The 
parameters βC and β0 have quite different values.  We may imagine βC > 0 as a result 
of behaviours more remote from competitive ones.  The presence of inertia in the evo-
lution of prices that characterizes these systems can also lead to the situation of β0=1.  
As a result, in this extreme case, instead of (1.6), we now have 
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  The rate of inflation (pt – pt-1) now takes a positive constant value because of 
the new characteristics of the economy.  The presence of a unit root in prices evolu-
tion is obvious. 
  So far we have confined our analysis to the real part of the economy.  We want 
to introduce the monetary part.  But before doing so, it is useful to clarify the signifi-
cation of αc in (1.3).  In fact, its value can be decomposed into 
     v C y α α + =           (1.8) 
thereby interpreting the effect of long-term growth of the economy on monetary circu-
lation  () y  and the correction to the behaviour of the velocity of money circulation 
() v α .  But, in actual fact, this behaviour should only be taken in “managed currency” 
systems.  There is no point in considering (1.8) in convertible currency systems. 
  In accordance with (1.5) we can admit that in convertible currency systems 
prices need not necessarily fall.  For that, it is enough that αC is sufficiently high.  But 
this value in such systems may be taken as random
53.  If it depends on the production 
of a precious metal and the relative price structure in large economies, then in small 
economies we must add the international circulation of precious metals that is estab-
lished in these economies.  This behaviour will dictate an increased likelihood of the 
absence of a unit root in the behaviour of prices in small economies that are relatively 
open to large economies. 
  We may look at the case of economies whose currency is non-convertible.  In 
this case we have the hypothesis of “managed currency” behaviour.  The concept of 
exogenous money supply  t m  is now introduced, and the equality of equilibrium be-
                                                           
53 This does not mean that some authors have not tried to endogenize the behaviour of the monetary 
supply of precious metals.  See the studies by Robert Barro (1979), Rockoff (1984) and Bennett 
McCallum (1989).   23
tween money demand and supply,  t t m m    = .  Equations (1.5) and (1.7) thus undergo a 
slight change 
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  This behaviour highlights the positive tendency in the growth of prices as a 
result of decisions on the money supply that over-value full employment product 
growth or that over-correct foreseeable reductions in the velocity of money circulation 
(or by default increases in this velocity).  An economy with policies geared to main-
taining full employment and which penalizes restrictions on liquidity, could lead to a 
continuous rise in prices, as mentioned above. 
  We find from (1.6), (1.7) and (1.9) that the behaviour of prices is substantially 
different in the two systems discussed here
54.  It is interesting to note that in the case 
of non-convertible currency we move straightaway from prices to a regular behaviour 
of the rate of inflation. 
  As mentioned above, we conclude that there is no point in taking inflation rate 
characteristics, in terms of mean values and standard deviation, to compare the per-
formances of the two systems
55.  On the contrary, we should compare periods (or 
economies) within a convertible currency system using the statistical characteristics of 
prices and, for a non-convertible currency system; we should use the inflation rate 
characteristics. 
  We have used simulated values to illustrate the consequences of not respecting 
this principle.  We simulated a series of 150 observations, using only the last 101 val-
ues (from 50 to 100).  The series of random values, ut, was created as the probabilistic 
value in accordance with the Normal (0,1), for the values that are generated by a uni-
                                                           
54 Despite the result found by Robert Barsky (1987). 
55 Lee Craig; Douglas Fisher and Theresa Spencer (1995) draw attention to the phenomenon of interna-
tional integration of prices under the gold standard, linking it to a lower rate of inflation.  This integra-
tion does not take the same form with national non-convertible currency.   24
form distribution
56.  The price series in the convertible currency system is given by 
t
C




t T u P P ⋅ + + = − 4 , 0     1 , where 
1     1 =
NC P .  The price series show mean values equal to 100.  We repeated the simula-
tion 500 times, so that the mean price or inflation rate is the mean of these means, and 
the standard deviation the mean of the standard deviations.  The coefficient of varia-
tion is given by the division of this last by the value obtained for the mean.  The val-
ues are found in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
  As we can see, the variable chosen for comparison determines which system is 
considered as the most stable.  If we consider the inflation rate though with a lower 
mean of inflation rates, the convertible currency system shows the highest value for 
the coefficient of variation.  The relative uncertainty is thus much greater in converti-
ble systems.  Precisely the opposite is found if we consider prices.  The most stable 
system now is that of currency convertibility.  It does not make sense to compare the 
Gold Standard with the later systems on the basis of the same variable, that is, the 
inflation rate, as Bordo and Kydland (1996) and Bordo and Kydland (1997) did for 
some countries, following the earlier results obtained by Basrky (1987).  In the same 
way as the test by George Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and Ron Alogoskoufis 
(1992) on the growth of the persistence of the Gold Standard inflation for the follow-
ing systems is deprived of meaning. 
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5. The Gold Standard in Portugal: some indicators 
5.1. General Indicators 
  The characterization of the Gold Standard period in Portugal is displayed in a 
comparative form in Tables 2 and 3.  We have included in these tables the Bretton 
Woods period from 1949 to 1972, and the subsequent period up to the EMU, from 
1973 to 1998.  The values included are the mean (µ) of the variable indicated there 
and the standard deviation (σ) of that variable. 
[Table 2 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
  The results are not very different from those found in Richard Cooper (1982), 
Bordo (1993), Bordo and Santos (1995) and Bordo and Jonung (2001).  Although the 
inflation rate was lower during the first period (0.2%), the standard deviation for in-
flation reached a higher value during the Gold Standard than during Bretton Woods. 
  However, as we have said, the comparison in terms of nominal stability
57, 
where the Gold Standard is concerned, should be made using prices, and not the infla-
tion rate.  Bearing this in mind, we can see how the Gold Standard period was one of 
great price stability.  Its standard deviation was 1/3 of that occurring during B-W.  As 
we expected, product growth was substantially higher during B-W, at almost 5% as 
against nearly 2%, during the Gold Standard.  There was also less product stability 
during this period
58.  With respect to the money supply, we should note lower growth 
under the Gold Standard and instability of such growth in the period following Bret-
ton Woods.  In short, we may conclude that the nominal stability during the Gold 
Standard contrasts with the real stability of the Bretton Woods period. 
 
                                                           
57 Accepting prices are stationary. 
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5.2. Analysis of the Stationarity of the Series 
  Before moving on to the study of the modelling of the Gold Standard period, 
we should examine the characteristic of stationarity of the series involved.  Besides 
the most current augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root
59, in which we follow the 
methodology proposed by Hamilton (1994), we performed other calculations, namely: 
the KPSS stationarity test
60; finding the limit values for ρ from the tADF test, at the 
level of 90%, in accordance with Stock (1991); Bhargava’s R1 e R2 ratios (1986), with 
the random walk null hypothesis against the alternative of stationarity, with and with-
out a constant, respectively; and, finally, the corrected ADF test, DFGLS, in accor-
dance with Graham Elliot, Thomas Rothenberg and James Stock (1996) and DFGLU, 
in accordance with Elliot (1999).  In the KPSS test we used the lags obtained in the 
first ADF test that eliminate the auto-correlation problem by means of the LM test.  
The asterisks have the usual meaning of rejection of H0, *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 
10%, except for the KPSS test, where *** means non-rejection of stationarity at 10%. 
  The results are given in Tables 4 and 5, below. 
[Table 4 here] 
[Table 5 here] 
  Regarding Product and Prices in the 1854-91 period, all the tests indicate that 
we should accept the stationarity of the respective series.  The results are not quite so 
clear with respect to Money: one test excludes the presence of a unit root and another 
does not exclude stationarity.  All the others correspond to a rejection of stationarity.  
One reason for these results may lie in the limit value to the right of ρ, a value very 
close to the unit. 
  As we said at the outset, we have a second Gold Standard period that lasted 
from 1891 to 1913.  In this period of “extended Gold Standard”, only Prices can be   27
taken as stationary.  Product and Money are clearly not stationary. During this period, 
Prices still have the characteristic appropriate for the convertible currency system. 
  In the light of these results, in terms of the construction of VAR models, we 
may opt for a model with variables on levels, for the first period.  For the second, we 
may choose a VAR model with variables on levels or with variables on first differ-
ences
61 including, where necessary, an ECM term
62.  Since we are also interested in 
comparing the results, we have chosen a VAR model on levels for the second period.  
As we shall see, special care is taken with the stationarity of the models obtained. 
 
6. A VAR model for 1854-91 and 1854-1913 
  Moving on to the study of a VAR model with Product (Q), Prices (P) and 
Money (M)
63, the model considered is of the type 
    A (L) ⋅xt = A0 + et      (2.1) 
where 














       (2.2) 
is the vector of the endogenous variables, A (L) the matrix of coefficients of the lags 
of xt, A0 the vector of the model’s constants, and et the vector of errors with the nor-
mal I.I.D. characteristics. 
  To select the order for the VAR model we used Akaike, (AIC = N ⋅ log⎢Ω⎥ + 2 
⋅ (kUR ⋅ K))
64 and Schwarz (SBC = N ⋅ log⎢Ω⎥ + kUR ⋅ K ⋅ log(N)) indicators, as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
59 Statistics tρ = 1 and N⋅ (ρ - 1), where N is the number of observations. See David Dickey and Wayne 
Fuller (1979), Peter Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Pierre Perron (1988). 
60 See Denis Kwiatkowski; Phillips; Peter Schmidt and Yomgcheol Shin (1992). 
61 Since the first difference for Product and Money are stationary variables. 
62 This means that we are estimating a VECM model. 
63 Q represents the per capita GDP at 1990 prices; P the implicit deflator of GDP 100 in 1990; and M 
represents the per capita M1 monetary stock. All the variables have been converted into logs. 
64 Where N, kUR and K represent the number of observations, the number of parameters for each equa-
tion of the unconstrained model and the VAR order, respectively.   28
a likelihood ratio test (LR) in accordance with the correction proposed by Sims 
(1980).  The values obtained are given in Table 6.  The value in brackets in the “LR” 
column is the significance level of the value of χ
2 of order 9. 
[Table 6 here] 
  As we can see, those two indicators and the LR test point in the same direc-
tion: reject K = 4 against K = 3, K = 3 against K = 2 and finally K = 2 against K = 1.  
The model that we are going to retain is thus of order 1.  As Table 7 shows, the root 
modules are below the unit, and so the model is stationary. 
[Table 7 here] 
  Employing the Choleski decomposition, we estimated the error variance de-
composition of each variable in terms of their individual contribution.  The results for 
the fiftieth observation are given in Table 8. 
[Table 8 here] 
We have to stress the influence of Product and Prices on Product and Prices.  
Money plays little part in explaining the errors of these variables.  Note too the impor-
tance of Money and Product on Money itself.  This behaviour may be explained by 
the fact that, in fact, the money is based on the production of metal and on fiduciary 
behaviour, which latter is dictated by the evolution of production.  
 
6.1. The Study of Shocks on the Model Variables 
 Continuing  with  the Choleski decomposition, we show in Figures 1 and 2 be-
low the effects of shocks (standard deviation of each estimation) on each variable
65. 
  As the models estimated are stationary (Table 7), the impulses resulting from 
shocks tend to become null with the passage of time.  Analysis of these models should 
                                                           
65 We used the RATS monteva2.prg program, which applies the methodology indicated in Sims and 
Tao Zha (1999). Below another RATS program is used montezha.prg, applying the same methodology 
to the case of an above-identified model.   29
therefore lead us to choose a maximum period for which we can carry out a study on 
the effects of such shocks.  For this we have chosen a period of ten years. 
  Graphic analysis of the effects of shocks shows some similarities, but also 
differences, in the two models. 
  A shock to Product: 
  ⎯ has immediate deflationary effects, but after 3 or 4 years the effect is virtu-
ally null; 
  ⎯ has long-lasting effects on Product and Money.  After 10 years Product and 
Money still register 1/3 and 36% of the percentage value of the shock on the Product, 
in the first model, and 27% and 30% in the second model
66. 
[Figure 1 here] 
  We can see what is happening when there is a shock to Prices: 
  ⎯ its effects on Product and Money are important. After 10 years these vari-
ables still registered 39% and 42% of the percentage value of the shock on Prices, in 
the first model, and 44% and 20%, in the second model; 
  ⎯ its effects on Prices themselves are very different in the two models.  In the 
first model, at the end of the 10 year period, the effect is 0.16% of the initial shock, 
and in the second it is 22%.  We may say, then, that in one case the effects were nulli-
fied quickly, while in the other these take longer. 
[Figure 2 here] 
  Finally, we can look at the reactions to a monetary shock: 
  ⎯ in both models, the effects on Prices vanish quite quickly, while on Product 
and Money they are more persistent.  After 10 years, the effects on these last two 
                                                           
66 This result differs from that obtained by Bordo (1993) using a VAR model with an inflation rate and 
product variation rate, where supply shocks also affect inflation. For an explanation of this “strange 
result”, see John Keating and John Nye (1998) and Tamim Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). Bayoumi 
and Bordo (1998), too, failed to get the results expected for the case of the USA, contrary to what hap-
pened for the United Kingdom.   30
variables are 4.1% and 4.5% of the initial percentage shock on Money, in the first 
model, and 2% and 5%, in the case of the second model, respectively; 
  ⎯ the deflationary effect of a growth of money, in the second model, is odd, 
to say the least, especially in the years close to the shock. 
  The results found for shocks to products can also be regarded as increases in 
the demand for coined metal, and the results obtained here are in agreement with the 
analysis by Barro (1979) and McCallum (1989), for the short-term, and also with 
Rockoff (1984), from the long-term perspective. 
  Two differences in the behaviour of the two models should be stressed: the 
effects of Price shock on Prices themselves, and the effects of a Money shock on 
Prices.  In the model restricted to the Gold Standard: the effects on Prices of a shock 
to Prices themselves are quickly annulled – which does not happen in the other model; 
and a shock to Money has positive effects on Prices, which, however, tend to disap-
pear quickly – while in the other model, we find deflationary effects
67.  Another fea-
ture of shocks, in either model, relates to the fact that, in the first model, Product 
variations are always accompanied by slightly higher Money variations, which does 
not happen in the second model.  This behaviour ought to mean that in a small econ-
omy, like that of Portugal, the positive evolution of a Product is accompanied by a 
Money evolution motivated by a requirement related to circulation or even reserves 
(or net wealth held). 
  Having analysed the impulses on variables, in the two models, it seem to us 
that they indicate a confirmation of Gold Standard behaviours in the case of the first 
model, that is, in the case of the model restricted to the exclusive Gold Standard pe-
riod.  This is why our analysis now on focuses solely on this period, and thus on the 
first model. 
                                                           
67 Bordo and Redish (1993) draw attention to deflationary policies in periods of non-convertibility as a 
way of resolving credibility problems.   31
  The results obtained above enable us to give some general characteristics for 
the Gold Standard period in Portugal.  In this period, Product, Prices and Money are 
stationary variables.  This means that no matter what the shock to each of them, it 
would end up being annulled, and thus it would leave no permanent effects.  In terms 
of macroeconomic behaviour, we found that the shocks to Product have very persis-
tent effects on Product itself and on Money.  Prices, too, have positive effects on 
Product and Money, although less important than shocks to Product.  Finally, the ef-
fects of shocks in Money supply are not felt on Prices, and are felt in product and it-
self, but extremely weakly.  The endogeneity of money and the behaviour of prices in 
a reality that is international are thus emphasized in this model of the Portuguese 
economy for the period 1854-1891. 
 
6.2. Analysis of Supply, Demand and Monetary Shocks 
  These results may be regarded as confirming the classical hypothesis of supply 
shocks (εS,t) which overwhelmingly affect the product and demand shocks (εD,t), or 
monetary shocks (εM,t), which are exerted on prices and not on production.  The errors 
of equation (2.1), instead of presenting the usual structure in a Choleski decomposi-
tion, 
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     (2.3) 
may take another form
68, where we define supply shocks as being exerted solely on 
production, demand shocks on prices, and nominal shocks that are exerted via a 
monetary equilibrium equation.  The Equation (2.4) expresses this behaviour, 
                                                           
68 Sims-Bernanke decomposition. See Ben Bernanke (1986).   32
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  This definition of shocks has become generally accepted.  But although the 
idea is promising, it cannot be sustained.  Equation (2.4) implies an over-
identification of order 1 of the matrix G which is clearly rejected by a probability ra-
tio test: χ
2 = 63.465. 
Within the possible definitions of shocks, and bearing in mind the results ob-
tained earlier, we eventually chose a model where the matrix G = G* took the follow-
ing form 
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     (2.5) 
  The likelihood ratio test leads to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis for a 
constraint implied in Equation (2.5), its value was χ
2 = 0.598 (0.439), where the re-
spective significance level is in brackets. 
  Using the above decomposition, we again considered shocks of the magnitude 
of the standard deviations associated with the estimation of the model.  The results are 
given in Figure 3. 
[Figure 3 here] 
  We given a brief description of the results obtained.  Supply shocks do not 
affect Prices
69 and have lasting positive effects on Product and Money.  After 10 
years, the effects on production and Money are still 60% and 64% of the initial per-
centage supply shock.  Demand shocks have deflationary effects on the Product and 
Money which are disappear relatively quickly.  The effects of a demand shock on 
Prices meant that by the 3
rd year less than 1/10 of the initial shock was registered, and   33
the effects disappeared swiftly
70.  Monetary shocks have positive effects on all the 
variables in the model, although these effects disappeared quickly with time
71.  The 
maximum effect on production occurred after 3 years and represents 9.5% of the ini-
tial monetary shock.  It is interesting to see that a joint supply and demand shock is 
neutral.  If the results are deflationary on the Product, in the first 3 years, and on 
Prices, in the first 4 years, these quickly converge to symmetrical values, nullifying 
any effect of these shocks in the medium term. 
  A better confirmation of the appropriate application of the principles of classi-
cal economics to the Gold Standard would be impossible to find.  But this does not 
mean that we would uphold the old notion of the equilibrium and smoothness of such 
a system
72.  In our ideas and, why not say so, too, in our culture, demand policies and 
monetary policies hold an important position.  Indeed, they either had harmful effects 
under the Gold Standard, or they had no significant impact at all.  It seems to us that 
Robert Mundell (1995) and Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) are equally correct when 
they attribute the disasters of inappropriate policies to the policies themselves, or to 
the actual system.  The Gold Standard did not allow the use of the policies we have 
seen above.  It was able to exist because it corresponded to the political consensus of 
those represented in the governments that really held power
73. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
69 It might be better to say that their effect is small and fleeting.  Falling into what we could call an 
example of beneficial deflation. 
70 Selahattin Dibooglu (1998), using a model of a similar type to that used here, supports the temporary 
growth of the effectiveness of demand shocks, which eventually accompanied the evolution of mone-
tary systems. 
71 This seems to support those who defend convertible systems as a way of achieving price stability. 
See Kevin Dowd (1993). 
72 The classical position of Bloomfield (1959) on these aspects is well known. 
73 See Jeffry Frieden (1992).   34
7. Conclusion 
  Thirty-seven years of convertibility, apart from the three-month moratorium in 
1876, demonstrated, for a peripheral country like Portugal, that the adoption of the 
Gold Standard in 1854, alone in following the example of Great Britain, was the right 
decision, and a practical one, given the chaos of the country’s monetary situation.  
Even though the factors that motivated it were obviously different from those which, 
two decades later, led most other countries to adhere to the disciplinary rigour of that 
monetary system. 
  Remittances from emigrants and the ability to borrow on the markets enabled 
Portugal to become a net importer of gold, which was a crucial factor for maintaining 
the gold convertibility of the Portuguese currency.  All this came to an end in 1891, 
when the country was unable to secure loans abroad and its monetary reserves were 
extremely depleted, largely thanks to the crisis in Brazil, the source of most of the 
emigrants’ earnings, and the monetary authorities had no choice but to adopt a system 
of a flexible exchange rate for non-convertible paper money. 
  Portugal returned to gold in 1931, but at a devalued parity.  In any case, this 
return lasted a brief 82 days.  As had happened in 1891, suspension of convertibility 
again resulted from an international financial crisis.  This act demonstrated the will-
ingness of the authorities to peg the monetary unit to international benchmark curren-
cies in an effort to achieve a situation of macroeconomic stability.  But times had 
changed and so had the requirements of economic policy.  Our work has shown that it 
would have been impossible for that system to continue. 
  The Gold Standard period for Portugal was, therefore, from 1854 to 1891, al-
though certain of its macroeconomic characteristics remained in place until 1913.   
The performance of the system in Portugal, compared with subsequent systems, was 
not much different, on the whole, form that experienced by other countries.   35
  Prices between 1854 and 1891 were stationary, that is to say, they exhibited 
the characteristics that were expected from the Gold Standard from the outset.  In an 
international market like the Gold Standard, a small economy, such as that of Portu-
gal, has absolutely no chance of controlling the money supply, and international com-
petition would drive towards single prices.  We can thus see the absence of inertia in 
the actual behaviour of prices, which was not observed for the large important 
economies in the international context.  Similarly, we can find in the modelling of 
supply, demand and monetary shocks, an illustration of the classical position of eco-
nomics.  But his last outcome also represents the reason why the Gold Standard could 
not exist after 1945.  A world that began to demand State intervention through de-
mand policies and monetary policy initiatives with the aim of achieving full employ-
ment is not compatible with the Gold Standard. 
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Table 1: Simulated Results 









≈ 0  0.014 123.38 
P




0.013 0.004  0.301 
 
Table 2: Values for Prices and Inflation 






1855-1891 0.0019  0.0604  0.0600 
1855-1913 0.0039  0.0508  0.0850 
1949-1972 0.0233  0.0228  0.1622 
1973-1998 0.1299  0.0612  1.0840 
 
Table 3: Values for Product and Money 








1855-1891 0.0195  0.0663  0.0327 0.0467 
1855-1913 0.0142  0.0566  0.0287 0.0433 
1949-1972 0.0492  0.0317  0.0694 0.0464 
1973-1998 0.0275  0.0342  0.1439 0.0703 
   44
Table 4: Unit Root and Stationarity Tests, 1854-91 
Test Product  Prices Money 
tρ = 1  − 4.107** (T)  − 4.317***  − 2.323 (T) 
N ⋅ (ρ − 1)  − 23.67** (T)  − 21.79***  − 23.22**(T) 
KPSS  0.083*** (T) 0.113*** 0.053***(T) 
Stock (ρm,M)  [−, 0.876]  [−, 0.839]  [0.853, 1.035] 
R1  - 0.9898**  0.2319 
R2  1.000** -  - 
DFGLS  − 2.790*  − 3.204***  − 1.742 
DFGLSU  − 3.022*  − 3.404***  − 1.842 
 
Table 5: Unit Root and Stationarity Tests,, 1854-1913 
Test Product  Prices Money 
tρ = 1  − 2.385 (T)  − 3.92** (T)  − 2.331 (T) 
N ⋅ (ρ − 1)  − 11.56 (T)  − 23.77** (T)  − 7.99(T) 
KPSS  1.015 (T) 0.282  (T) 0.621(T) 
Stock (ρm,M)  [0.846, 1.035]  [−, 0.904]  [0.832, 1.018] 
R1  - 0.353  0.2079 
R2  0.3321 -  - 
DFGLS  − 1.625  − 3.170**  − 0.151 
DFGLSU  − 2.103  − 3.265**  − 2.166 
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Table 6: Selection of the VAR order 1854-1891 and 1854-1913 
Lags AIC SBC  LR  AIC SBC  LR 
4 -569.6  -510.3    -1001.0 -922.1   
3  -571.7  -526.0  9.936 (0.356)  -1005.9 -945.1  10.111 (0.341) 
3 -585.7  -539.1    -1013.8 -952.5   
2  -595.2  -562.5  6.085 (0.731)  -1020.1 -977.2  9.658 (0.379) 
2 -599.4  -566.1    -1019.5 -976.2   
1  -610.5  -591.5  6.855 (0.652)  -1034.5 -1009.7 2.206 (0.988) 
 
Table 7: Roots of the Characteristic Polynomial, 1854-1891 and 1854-1913 
Root Module  Root Module 
0.95544 0.95544  0.97275 0.97275 
0.33190 – 0.023i  0.3327  0.80776  0.80776 
0.33190 + 0.023i  0.3327  0.39223  0.39223 
 
 
Table 8: Variance Decomposition – 50
th Observation 
Influence  of:  Q P M Q P M 
Product  88.2 9.3  2.5 79.8  18.3 1.9 
Prices  81.2 17.8  1.0  62.8 31.3  5.9 
Money  55.8 6.0 38.2  43.2 3.2 53.6 
 








































































































Figure 1: Standard Deviation Shocks (Choleski), 1854-91 
 













































































































Figure 2: Standard Deviation Shocks (Choleski), 1854-1913 
 





































































































Figure 3: Standard Deviation Shocks (Sims-Bernanke), 1854-91 
 
 